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LABOR LAW
What Limitations PeriodApplies to a Suit Brought
by a Union MemberAgainst a Union under the LMRDA?
byJay E. Grenig
G. P. Reed
V.
United Transportation Union, et al.
(Docket No. 87-1031)
Argument Date: Nov. 2,1988
Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) is sometimes referred to as the
"Bill of Rights" for union members. Tide I regulates internal
union affairs and protects union members from un-democrat-
ic abuses by union leaders. In this case the Supreme Court is
called upon to determine a rather technical question: wheth-
er a three-year state limitation period for personal injuries or
a six-month federal limitation period for unfair labor prac-
tices should apply to Title I suits.
ISSUE
This case presents the question of what limitation period
applies to a suit brought against a union by a union member
alleging violations of rights under Title I of the LMRDA.
FACIS
G. P. Reed works for a bus company in Charlotte, N.C. For
many years, he was also the secretary/treasurer of United
Transportation Union, Local 1715. As secretary/ treasurer,
Reed received a small monthly salary from the Local. Be-
cause union duties sometimes require union officers to take
time off from work without pay, Reed and other Local officers
received reimbursement from the Local for lost time.
In 1982 an auditor for the national union disallowed
checks paid by the Local to Reed for "time lost" in the
amount of $1,210.20. Reed paid the disallowed amount, but
appealed the auditor's findings to the union president. Reed
claimed that the re-payment had been demanded on the
ground that he had to get prior approval for "losing" the time
and doing the union work. He contended that no such prior
approval requirement had existed or been enforced before
its application to him. The union president responded that
when a local officer is salaried, his regular salary is meant to
cover the responsibilities of his office.
The union president concluded the disallowed payments
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had been claimed for the performance of ordinary duties and
responsibilities of Reed's office. When Reed subsequently
sought to enforce the "prior approval" policy to requests for
reimbursement by other Local officers, the union president
ordered Reed to pay those claims.
Thereafter, in July 1983 Reed's attorney wrote the union,
claiming that the heart of the conflict involved the Local
president's harassment of Reed for not supporting the Local
president's views. In August 1985 Reed filed suit under Title
I of the LMRDA, claiming that the union and others had
violated his rights to freedom of speech and assembly as a
union member as well as his right to be safeguarded from
improper disciplinary action.
The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the complaint had not been filed within the
required time period. The union asserted that the six-month
limitation period provided by Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations was applicable here. The trial court deter-
mined that the appropriate limitations period for a Title I
claim was the three-year North Carolina statute governing
personal injuries. Proceedings were stayed pending appeal.
The United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the lower court and held that the six-month limita-
tion period applied to Reed's claim 828 F. 2d 1066 (4th Cir.
1987).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Many federal statutes such as the LMRDA do not include
an express limitation on the period within which an action
under the statute must be brought. Rather than assuming
Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at
all, the courts frequently "borrow" the most closely analo-
gous statute of limitations under state law.
Where state statutes of limitation are unsatisfactory vehi-
cles for the enforcement of federal law, the Supreme Court
has held that it may be inappropriate to conclude that
Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the
purpose or operation of federal substantive law. In such
cases the courts have declined to borrow state tatutes, but
have, instead, used timeliness rules drawn from federal
law-such as limitations periods from related federal
statutes.
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Supreme Court set out the consider-
ations which must be met before a court departs from the
practice of borrowing from the analogous state statute of
limitations. Recognizing that resort to state law remains the
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norm for borrowing of limitations periods for federal causes
of action, the Court stated that, when a rule from elsewhere
in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than do the
available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significant-
ly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, the
federal rule should be used.
Here, the Court must determine whether the six-month
limitation period in Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act provides a closer analogy than the state statute
of limitations for personal injuries, and whether the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
limitation period significantly more appropriate.
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, four other circuits have
determined that the rationale of DelCostello Is applicable to
LMRDA "Bill of Rights" actions and have applied the six-
month statute of limitations. The First and Second Circuits
have refused to apply the six-month period and have applied
state personal-injury limitations.
Some have suggested that selection of the six-month
limitation period would be consistent with the national labor
policy of quick resolution and finality of labor disputes,
whether they occur internally or externally, while others
have contended that the six-month limitations period would
pose a threat to union members' access to judicial protection.
ARGUMENTS
For G. P. Reed (Counsel of Record, Jonathan Wallas, 700
East Stonewall St., Suite 730, Charlotte, NC28202; telephone
(704)375-8461)
1. Clait ns under Title I of the LMRDA do not fit within the
exceptions to the longstanding practice of borrowing
limitations periods from state law.
2. The litigation practicalities of Title I action militate
against exceptions to the practice of borrowing limita-
tions periods from state law.
For United Transportation Union (Counsel of Record,
Clinton J Miller, I11, 14600 Detroit Ave., Cleveland, OH
441074250; telephone (216) 228.9400)
1. Uniformity is required with regard to a federal claim,
which has a closely analogous federal limitations statute.
2. The lingering threat of assertion of Title I claims can have
a debilitating effect within the union if allowed to fester,
making speedy resolution all the mdre desirable in the
practicalities of litigation.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of G. P. Reed
The Association for Union Democracy and Public Citizen
filed an amicus brief in support of G. P. Reed, asserting that
the DelCostello rationale for borrowing a six-month period
does not apply to LMRDA claims because the LMRDA claims
do not pose an immediate or direct threat to labor peace or to
labor-management compromises.
in Support of the United Transportation Union
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations filed an amicus brief in support of the
United Transportation Union, asserting that the LMRDA's
form and its raison d'etre derive from the system of exclusive
representation which is a unique, Integral part of the national
labor policy and has no analogue in ordinary state law.
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